This article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.
I. Introduction
The ability of a firm's owners to maximize the value of their shares depends in part on the preferences of self-interested managers who make decisions on their behalf.
Risk taking is one main area where managerial and shareholder interests may differ.
Specifically, risk-averse managers with a substantial proportion of their wealth invested in firm-specific human capital may have a preference for lower risk than well-diversified stockholders (e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981) ). In the absence of any incentive mechanisms, managers' investment decisions will be biased towards low risk projects at the expense of shareholders. However, previous work suggests that ownership of stock and stock options induces managers to take more risk, thus better aligning manager and shareholder interest. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) provide such evidence for industrial firms, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2001) for oil and gas producers, and Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) for banks. 1 The relation between managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value and risk taking is of particular importance to bondholders, who may suffer from shareholders' incentives to take risk. It is argued that shareholders of a levered firm often have an incentive to implement investment strategies that reduce the value of the firm's outstanding debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Galai and Masulis (1976) ). In particular, limited liability stockholders may have incentives to expropriate bondholder wealth by investing in risky projects. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) show that these distortions in investment decisions can be substantial. However, while the asset- 1 In the banking industry the incentive to take risk is exacerbated by deposit insurance. substitution problem is typically described in terms of distortions in investment decisions, wealth transfers between shareholders and bondholders can also occur in firms whose risk may increase as a result of other types of managerial decisions, such as spin-offs (Parrino (1997) , Maxwell and Rao (2003) ), share repurchases (Maxwell and Sephens (2003) ), takeovers (Shastry (1990) ), acquisitions (Billet, King and Mauer (2004) ), or payout policy (Dhillon and Johnson (1994) ). By observing management incentive structures, rational lenders should correctly anticipate their future risk choices at the time when debt is issued and adjust the required yields accordingly, thus relating managerial incentives to the agency costs of debt finance 2 . However, there is no direct evidence that lenders consider top-management incentive structures when pricing new bond issues.
This paper examines the effect of top-management incentives to maximize shareholder value on the cost of public debt issues. When managers' wealth invested in the firm is largely in firm-specific (undiversifiable) human capital their optimal degree of risk taking may be less than that desired by stockholders. However, increasing managers' stock ownership in the firm makes their risk taking incentives become more closely aligned to those of shareholders, as long as their ownership stake is not so large a proportion of their financial wealth as to make them overly concerned with the (potentially undiversifiable) nonsystematic risk of the firm. Thus, the first hypothesis I 2 Smith and Warner (1979) argue that the restrictions on shareholder behavior imposed by bond covenants reduce required bond yields. However, bond covenants can be costly to write and enforce, and they can limit a firm's flexibility to respond to unexpected contingencies. McDaniel (1986) finds that debt covenants contain almost no restrictions on the ability of firms to increase their risk. Therefore, the protection offered by these covenants cannot totally eliminate the agency costs of debt.
investigate is that firms where managerial and shareholder interests are more closely aligned will experience higher borrowing costs.
Firms achieve such incentive alignment primarily by inducing management to hold firm's equity and stock options on the firm's equity. If managerial stock options provide better risk-taking incentives than stock (Guay (1999) ), bondholders should anticipate larger wealth transfers arising from managerial stock options than from equity ownership. Hence, my second hypothesis is that the effect of managerial stock options on borrowing costs will be higher than that of equity ownership.
I also examine whether the relationship between managerial ownership and borrowing costs is non-linear. Previous work suggests that at high ownership levels managers can become entrenched and so their risk choices can deviate from value maximization without being disciplined by shareholders. In addition, large equity stakes invested in the firm can induce managers to be more concerned with the nonsystematic (nondiversifiable) risk of the firm, effectively mitigating or even reducing their risk taking incentives. Both arguments suggest that the positive effect of higher ownership on managerial risk taking can be weaker (or even reversed) when managerial ownership stakes are already very large. Thus, my third hypothesis is that the relation between managerial incentives and borrowing costs is concave (and perhaps decreasing at very high ownership levels).
The empirical analysis uses a sample of new debt issues during 1993-2000 to explore the effect of managerial ownership of stock and stock options on at-issue yield spreads of corporate bonds, while controlling for bond features, firm characteristics, industry, and year effects. The results reported in this study are robust to concerns of endogeneity of managerial incentives, self-selection of firms into the sample, outliers, non-linearities in credit markets, and alternative measures of key control variables.
I find support for all three hypotheses. A higher alignment of managerial and shareholder interest is associated with higher at-issue yield spreads. The findings also confirm the intuition that higher incentives to maximize shareholder wealth generate higher agency costs of debt when managers have more flexibility to choose investment policy and thus are more able to increase risk. Distinguishing between the effects of stock and stock options shows that managerial stock options have a substantially larger effect on borrowing costs than managerial stock ownership. This result is consistent with stock options providing better risk-taking incentives than stock, and with prospective bondholders anticipating higher risk-shifting incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership. When I allow for non-linear effects, I find that the relation between managerial incentives and borrowing costs is increasing but concave. This evidence is consistent with managers becoming either entrenched or more risk-averse at high levels of ownership, which can mitigate the effect of a higher incentive alignment on borrowing costs.
Consistent with ownership structure being an important determinant of the agency costs of debt, the magnitude of the effect I document is economically important. For a moderate change in ownership, and everything else constant, borrowing costs increase by 3.4 basis points when we move from a firm with top-management ownership at the sample median (1.46%) to a firm with managerial ownership of 2.46% (a one percentage point increase). Taking a larger increase in ownership, my estimates suggest that borrowing costs are 8 basis points higher at a firm with top-management ownership in the 75 th percentile (3.19%) than in a firm with top-management ownership in the 25 th percentile (0.82%).
Related studies of the connection between ownership structure and borrowing costs include Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) , who show that founding family ownership reduces the agency costs of debt finance, and Strock Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders, and Travlos (1994) , who document a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range, but no relation for low or high ownership levels. In the same vein, DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) find that the adoption of executive stock option plans is associated with a positive stock and a negative bond market reaction, which is consistent with the notion that executive stock options may induce wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders. This paper contributes to this literature by presenting strong evidence that top-management incentives to maximize shareholder value affect the cost of debt finance. In addition, the analysis shows that the incentives to take risk provided by managerial stock options have a substantially larger effect on borrowing costs than stock ownership, and that the relation between managerial incentives and borrowing costs is increasing and concave.
This study is also related to research on the effect of other aspects of corporate governance on bond yields. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examine how bond yields are affected by board composition and the presence of institutional investors. In addition, Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2004) look at the effects of takeover vulnerability on bond yields, and Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2004) extend their analysis to consider the effects of takeover vulnerability and its interaction with the existence of large institutional shareholders. My findings complement this literature and suggest that managerial incentive structures are an important aspect of corporate governance affecting bond risk.
There is also a growing literature about the incentive effects of managerial stock options. Contrary to the common intuition about more convex compensation schedules (e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) , Smith and Watts (1982) , Stulz (1985), Guay (1999) ), recent work suggests that risk-averse managers can have relatively little incentives to invest in highly risky projects even when they receive large amounts of option-based compensation (Carpenter (2000) , Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2002) , Ross (2004) ). The findings reported in this paper add to this debate by suggesting that prospective bondholders expect more risk-taking when managers have higher equity ownership, and especially larger amounts of stock options. Finally, my results also add to the large literature that focuses on the determinants of bond yields (e.g., Sorensen (1979) , Dyl and Joehnk (1979) , Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1997) , Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1999) ) by suggesting that executive compensation practices can affect the cost of new debt issues.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II describes the data.
Section III introduces the empirical model and discusses the variables employed. Section IV reports the results of the multivariate analysis and discusses their economic significance. Section V presents some robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
II. Sample formation and data description
I obtain a comprehensive sample of public straight debt offers made by U.S. The sample does not include any bond offers that are unit offerings (composed of debt and common equity), which could confound the effects. 4 The number of issues per year is 81 in 1994, 131 in 1995, 147 in 1996, 280 in 1997, 389 in 1998, 216 in 1999, and 116 in 2000. In addition, the median number of issues per firm during the period is 8. median). The issues have mean (median) maturity of 13.1 years (10.0 years). Most of the bonds issued are investment grade, and almost 30% of the issues are callable.
Insert Table 1 here
The firm characteristics reported in the table could proxy for different aspects of firm risk that may be relevant for lenders in assessing the risk of a bond issue. They include proxies for the likelihood of default, such as book leverage and interest coverage, and proxies for firm risk and the scope for moral hazard in managerial investment decisions, such as business risk, the market-to-book ratio, fixed assets, capital expenditures, and R&D expenses. These firm characteristics exhibit substantial crosssectional variation and will be used as control variables in the regression analysis. OPTIONS is the number of shares related to top-management unexercised stock options as a percentage of total shares outstanding 5 .
Insert Table 2 here
The table shows that top management holds 0.39% of the firm's shares at the median, while the number of unexercised options on the firm's stock is equivalent to 5 The variable OPTIONS includes the number of all unexercised options held by the top five executives, regardless of whether they are vested or not, and whether they are in or out of the money. almost 1% of the firm's shares outstanding (also at the median). In addition, there is a large cross-sectional variation in top-management holdings of stock and stock options. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) show that the variation in managerial incentives across firms is explained by differences in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. The multivariate regression analysis in Section IV uses this variation to identify the effect of managerial incentive structures on at-issue yield spreads.
III. Empirical model and variable discussion
The ex-ante yield spread over a U.S. Treasury security of comparable maturity reflects the market's assessment of the risk of the bond issue. This study applies a multivariate regression model with the at-issue yield spread of corporate bonds as the dependent variable, and exploits the cross-sectional variation in management incentive structures to examine whether managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value affect the agency costs of debt finance. I use the following primary specification to investigate the relation between managerial incentives and borrowing costs:
(1) Table 3 shows the definitions of the variables I use in the empirical analysis, which are divided into managerial incentives and control variables. A brief discussion of the variables follows.
Insert Table 3 here
A. Managerial incentive variables I use three different managerial incentive variables: ALPHA, which combines managerial equity and stock option holdings as a percentage of shares outstanding, OWNER, which is simply management fractional ownership, and OPTIONS, defined as the number of shares related to top-management unexercised stock options as a percentage of total shares outstanding. All these incentive variables are measured at the year-end preceding the bond issue. Therefore, I use ex-ante managerial incentive structures to predict the yield spread of future debt issues. After controlling for firm and bond characteristics, if a higher alignment of managerial and shareholder interest leads to higher agency costs of debt finance, then we would expect the coefficients of these variables to be positive.
I estimate my empirical model under the assumption that managerial incentives are exogenous in the yield spread regressions. More precisely, I assume that managerial incentives are optimally set before debt is issued (recall that the incentive variables correspond to the year preceding the issue). In Section V I suggest reasons for the potential endogeneity of managerial incentives, and I show that the results are robust to endogeneity concerns. A related issue is that shareholders may increase incentive alignment after debt is issued to induce further wealth transfers from bondholders. If this is the case, spreads could reflect expected future risk-shifting incentives by managers and not just the current incentives that my variables capture. However, Persons (1994) argues that dispersed shareholders would have to overcome severe collective choice problems to engage in such opportunism. In addition, as firms re-enter debt markets very often, reputation costs reduce the incentive to reset managerial incentives ex-post. Furthermore, Zhou (2001) shows that most companies seem to have a target level of managerial ownership that does not change or changes slowly over time, suggesting that using current managerial incentive structures does not pose any serious problem.
B. Bond ratings
All regressions control for the bond's rating. I expect the yield spread to be negatively related to the bond's rating. To convert Moody's bond rating into an ordinal scale index, I construct a variable that takes a value of one when the bond is rated Caa-C, two when rated B1-B3, three when rated Ba1-Ba3, four when rated Baa1-Baa3, five when rated A1-A3, six when rated Aa1-Aa3 and seven when rated Aaa. As the quality of the bond increases, we expect the impact of the rating on yield spreads to diminish. Thus, I compute the natural logarithm of the ordinal scale rating variable (results are similar if I use a linear or quadratic specification of the rating index).
Rating agencies are aware of the importance of corporate governance (and management ownership in particular) in assessing a company's creditworthiness 6 . In addition, recent work shows that corporate governance affects bond ratings (Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) , Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2004) ). As a result, a potential problem is that the bond-rating index is likely to contain the effect of managerial incentives on bond risk. Thus, the direct effect of managerial ownership on borrowing costs may me obscured when the bond's rating is added as a control variable in my regressions 7 . I deal with this collinearity problem by estimating the bond-rating index without the managerial incentives component using the approach in Datta, IskandarDatta, and Patel (1999) , Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) , and Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2004) . That is, the rating variable used as a control in all regressions, RATING, is the residual of a regression of the natural logarithm of the bond-rating index on the corresponding managerial incentive variables. Thus, in each regression specification, RATING can be interpreted as the component of the rating index not accounted for by the managerial incentive variables.
C. Debt characteristics variables
All regressions control for the characteristics of the bond issued. If an increase in leverage makes the bonds riskier, then the larger the relative issue size (RELAMOUNT), the greater the expected yield spread. Longer-maturity debt issues are potentially subject to greater interest-rate risk exposure and can have a higher default risk. In addition, longer maturities can make it easier for shareholders to gain at the expense of bondholders by selecting riskier projects. Thus, I expect a positive relation between a bond's maturity (YRSTOMAT) and yield spreads.
7 Consistent with the presumption that a higher alignment of managerial and shareholder interest can make the bonds riskier, the sample correlations between the bond rating index and ALPHA, OPTIONS, and OWNER are negative and large: -0.29, -0.28, and -0.26, respectively. SUBORD, CALLABLE, SINKFUND, and CHGCONTROL are dummy variables for whether the bond issue is subordinated to other types of debt, callable before maturity, has a sinking fund provision or has a change in control put option, respectively. Since subordinated bonds are riskier than senior debt, the yield spread for subordinated debt should be higher than for senior debt. From the bondholder's perspective, bonds that are callable have prepayment risk. Hence, we expect callable bonds to have higher yield spreads. The sinking fund provision makes a bond safer for the bondholder by increasing the likelihood of receiving the principal amount of the loan. Sinking funds, however, are likely to be attached to riskier bonds (Myers (1977) , Smith and Warner (1979) ). Because of these opposite effects, the effect of this provision on yield spreads can only be resolved empirically. If bondholders value the protection given by change in control puts, then issues with put options should have lower yield spreads. On the other hand, these covenants may be attached to riskier bonds and could be associated with higher yield spreads. Thus, the effect of CHGCONTROL on yield spreads is also ambiguous.
The SDC data does not contain detailed information about debt covenants that could directly restrict a firm's production and investment policy. These covenants reduce a bond's risk by limiting the incentives for asset substitution, and should therefore be reflected in lower yield spreads. If the existence of these covenants is correlated with managerial incentives, their omission in the regression analysis could bias the results.
However, Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that direct restrictions on production and investment policy would be very expensive to employ, and report that covenants of this type are not observed in practice. More recently, in a study of bonds issued by large U.S.
corporations, McDaniel (1986) found almost no restrictions of the ability of firms to increase their risk. Even if some bonds have such covenants, their effect is contained in the bond's rating, which is included as a control variable in the regression analysis.
Furthermore, the qualitative results of the paper remain unchanged when managerial incentives are instrumented, which mitigates any potential bias due to the correlation of managerial incentives and these unobserved covenants. Thus, the lack of more detailed data on bond covenants does not create a serious problem.
D. Firm characteristics variables
I use firm characteristics measured at year-end preceding the bond issue as additional control variables. Larger firms are generally considered safer investments because of larger asset base (collateral), higher likelihood of diversified assets, greater proportion of tangible assets, and better chances of survival in the long run. I define SIZE as the natural logarithm of total assets and I expect firm size to be negatively related to the yield spreads.
To control for default risk I include the debt to assets ratio (DAT) and the interest coverage ratio (INTCOV). I expect a positive effect of DAT and a negative effect of INTCOV on the yield spreads, respectively. As more profitable firms are less likely to default, I expect a negative relation between the yield spreads and PROFITABILITY. In addition, I code a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports a negative operating income, and zero otherwise (LOSS). I expect a positive relation between LOSS and yield spreads. I also control for business risk (BUSRISK) and expect that riskier firms pay higher yield spreads.
Because investment in fixed capital is observable, more easily monitored by lenders, and provides good collateral, firms with tangible assets will generally be less higher risk for bondholders, and thus should lead to higher yield spreads. However, the market-to-book ratio also serves as a proxy for firm performance (e.g., Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998)), and so it could be negatively related to borrowing costs. In addition, capital expenditure is typically in a form that can be used for collateral to support debt, making the bond issue less risky. Hence, while the effects of MTBR and CAPEX on yield spreads are potentially ambiguous, I expect the effect of RDEXP to be positive.
Consistent with dividends transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) find a positive stock and negative bond market reaction to large dividend increases. I control for any potential effect of a firm's payout policy on bond risk by including a dummy variable (PAYDIV) that indicates whether the firm pays common dividends or not. Finally, Titman (1982) argues that firms that make products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts may find liquidation especially costly, and thus should use less debt. Because such firms may have different risk attributes than other firms in my sample, I code a dummy variable that identifies these firms (UNIQUE) and include it in my regressions.
E. Other control variables
Given that yield spreads may vary through time, all regressions also include a set of year dummy variables to capture the potential effects of changes in the term structure and/or changes in the economic environment that may affect bond yield spreads in a particular year. The regressions also include seven industry dummies, corresponding to one-digit SIC codes. This ensures that it is the variation in managerial incentive structures within industries that identifies the coefficients estimated in the following section.
IV. Multivariate analysis
A. Evidence of the effect of managerial incentives on borrowing costs Table 4 reports the regression results when I capture managerial incentives using managers' combined holdings of stock and stock options, together with the predicted sign for each of the coefficient estimates. All regressions in the table include year and industry dummies. The standard errors used to construct the t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and are also adjusted for the clustering of observations in firms that make multiple issues. That is, I assume that observations are independent across firms, but not necessarily independent within firms.
Insert Table 4 here where I use MTBR, RDEXP, and CAPEX to proxy the availability of discretionary investment opportunities. The coefficient estimate of β 1 is 1.119, with a t-statistic of 1.96.
The estimate of β 2 is not statistically significant, but the estimates of β 3 and β 4 are 0.349 and 0.014, respectively, and are statistically significant (t-statistics of 2.48, and 1.90, respectively). The results are available from the author. These findings confirm the intuition that higher incentives to maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth generate higher agency costs of debt when managers have more flexibility to choose investment policy (i.e., more opportunities to shift risk and expropriate bondholders).
Overall, the evidence from this section suggests that prospective bondholders use the information contained in managerial incentive structures to anticipate a firm's future risk choices, and incorporate this information in the pricing of new debt issues. Thus, a higher alignment of managerial and shareholder interests leads to higher borrowing costs.
B. Distinguishing between the incentives provided by stock and stock options As discussed in the introduction, there is no consensus about the effectiveness of stock options in inducing agents to take risks. In the context of this study, it is important to explore whether lenders perceive the incentives provided by stock and stock options to be the same. Because managers have a tendency to be more risk averse than shareholders and managerial stock options can be more effective than stock in encouraging risk-taking, the effect of managerial stock options on the cost of debt issues could be larger than that of equity ownership.
To investigate whether managerial stock and stock options have a different impact on borrowing costs, Table 5 repeats the regression analysis decomposing managerial incentives into fractional ownership by management (OWNER) and the number of topmanagement unexercised stock options as a percentage of shares outstanding (OPTIONS). Columns (1) to (3) of the table use OPTIONS, OWNER, and both OPTIONS and OWNER as the measures of managerial incentives, respectively.
Insert Table 5 here
The results corroborate the intuition that managerial stock and stock options provide different incentives to take risk. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of OPTIONS and OWNER are 6.742 and 1.823, respectively, and both are statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient estimate of OPTIONS is almost four times larger than the coefficient of OWNER, suggesting that managerial stock options have a much stronger effect on borrowing costs than stock. The last column of the table includes both variables, and therefore corresponds to the decomposition of ALPHA (which equals OWNER+OPTIONS). Although the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates on OPTIONS and OWNER fall, they remain statistically significant and positive, with the effect of stock options on borrowing costs being larger than that of managerial equity. A one-tail test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of OPTIONS and OWNER are equal against the alternative that the coefficient of OPTIONS is larger than that of OWNER at 10% significance level (t=1.58). If the incentive variables are specified as the natural logarithm of one plus OPTIONS and the natural logarithm of one plus OWNER the results are qualitatively similar (results available from the author). Thus, consistent with stock options being more effective in encouraging risk-taking by managers, the results in Table 5 support my second hypothesis that prospective bondholders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock option holdings than from their equity holdings.
C. Allowing non-linear effects of managerial incentives on borrowing costs
The positive association between managerial incentives and borrowing costs is likely to be non-linear. Specifically, inducing even larger managerial holdings of stock and stock options when they are already very large can lead managerial incentives to diverge from value maximization. First, at high ownership levels managers can become "entrenched" and can pursue non-value maximizing activities without being disciplined by shareholders (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)) 9 . Second, increasing managerial ownership when ownership is already high can induce managers to be more risk-averse rather than to encourage risk taking, i.e., management's wealth invested in the firm may become so large as to make managers very sensitive to the potentially undiversifiable, nonsystematic risk of the firm (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) ).
Both arguments suggest that very high levels of managerial ownership may lead to reduced (rather than increased) risk-taking incentives. A more conservative investment policy would benefit prospective bondholders, and thus should be reflected in the bond yields required at issue. As a result, at high levels of managerial ownership the positive relation between ownership and borrowing costs could be weaker, and could even be reversed if the effects discussed above are strong enough. Thus, the third hypothesis I investigate is that of a concave relation between managerial incentives and yield spreads.
To capture non-linear effects, the specifications in Table 6 add squared terms of the incentive variables, and distinguish between the incentives provided by stock and 9 These authors find that firm performance measured by Tobin's Q first increases and then decreases with managerial ownership. They interpret the positive relation at low levels of ownership as evidence of incentive alignment, and the negative relation at high levels as evidence of managerial entrenchment. stock options. While logarithmic transformations of the incentive variables give qualitatively similar results, I use squared terms instead to allow the possibility of yield spreads decreasing in managerial incentives at some level of ownership.
Insert Table 6 here
In column (1), where managerial incentives from stock and stock options are combined into ALPHA, the coefficient estimates of ALPHA and ALPHA 2 are positive and negative, respectively, and statistically significant. This finding provides strong support for the hypothesis of a concave relation between managerial incentives and at-issue yield spreads. However, even though the effect of increases in ALPHA is weaker at higher levels of ALPHA, the effect remains positive and large for most values of ALPHA contained in the sample. Given the estimated coefficients, increases in ALPHA would lead to decreases in yield spreads only for values of ALPHA above 30.47%, which is greater than the value corresponding to the 98 th sample percentile (30.13%).
Columns (2)-(4) decompose managerial incentives into incentives from shares, captured by OWNER, and from stock options, captured by OPTIONS. The coefficient estimates of OPTIONS and OPTIONS 2 are positive and negative, respectively, and statistically significant, indicating a strong concave relation between OPTIONS and yield spreads. However, there is no evidence of a concave relation between the incentives from shares and yield spreads, as the squared term is negative but not statistically significant.
The estimates in Column (4) imply that the effect of higher managerial holdings of stock options on yield spreads diminishes for higher levels of OPTIONS, but remains positive throughout most of the sample as it would become negative only for values of OPTIONS above 5.66%, which is above the value corresponding to the 98 th percentile.
To summarize, the results indicate that there is an increasing and concave relation between managerial incentives and yield spreads, and that this concavity is driven primarily by managerial stock options holdings rather than stock ownership.
D. Economic significance of the results
To assess the economic significance of the results reported in Table 6 In their follow-up paper, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2002) extend their previous simulation exercise to incorporate the manager-stockholders conflict of interest regarding risk-taking, as well as expected changes in future tax shields and bankruptcy costs when firm risk changes. While the authors do not provide direct estimates of the effect of investment distortions on borrowing costs, they conclude that, in contrast to the usual arguments in the literature, risk-averse managers compensated with equity-based compensation may have very little incentives to adopt risky projects. Specifically, they argue that, even when equity-based compensation provides risk-taking incentives, changes in the values of tax shields and bankruptcy costs can more than offset wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders, leading to risk-averse behavior by managers.
On the other hand, Guay (1999) shows that firms' stock-return volatility is positively related to the convexity of payoffs in managers' incentive schemes, and concludes that this effect is large enough to influence financing and investing decisions by risk-averse managers. Related empirical work also shows evidence that more convex compensation schemes induce risk-taking in industrial firms (Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) , Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001)), oil and gas producers (Rajgopal and Shevlin (2001)), and banks (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) ).
The magnitudes reported in this study can also be compared to those in recent empirical work that examines the effect of other aspects of corporate governance on bond yields. This literature also explores these effects using samples of financially healthy and large publicly traded corporations. Consistent with these effects being economically significant, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2002) find that founding family ownership is associated with costs of debt that are 32 basis points lower than in non-family firms, and argue that bondholders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2004) find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing, while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 30 basis points between the two groups. The authors argue that antitakeover amendments are an effective tool that better protects bondholder interest. In a related paper, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2004) find that stronger shareholder control is associated with lower yields if the firm is protected from takeovers, but associated with higher yields if the firm is exposed to takeovers, and that the difference can be as high as 139 basis points.
To summarize, while some recent theoretical work suggests that stockholderbondholder conflicts may not significantly distort investment decisions, there is a large empirical literature that documents a connection between managerial incentive structures and risk taking. In addition, recent empirical work on the effect of corporate governance on bond yields documents large effects. While the existing literature does not seem to provide a definitive answer about how large the effect of incentive structures on borrowing costs should be, the findings reported in this and related studies are consistent with ownership structure being an important determinant of the agency costs of debt.
V. Sensitivity analysis
A. Possible endogeneity of managerial incentives in the yield spreads regressions
It could be argued that the managerial incentives variables can be endogenous in the yield spreads regressions. First, an omitted risk factor correlated with both managerial incentives and yield spreads could cause a spurious relation between ALPHA and yield spreads. Second, perhaps firm risk affects how firms set managerial incentives, with riskier firms inducing a higher (or lower) alignment of managerial-shareholder interest.
Third, recent models suggest that capital structure and executive compensation decisions are made simultaneously (e.g., Brander and Poitevin (1992) , John and John (1993) ).
To address these concerns, I estimated the basic regressions in Table 4 by twostage least squares (2SLS), treating ALPHA as an endogenous variable. The instruments used are the natural logarithm of firm sales, sales per employee, cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales, selling expenses as a percentage of sales, sales growth, and squared terms of these variables. The second stage coefficient estimates of ALPHA are statistically significant and similar to the OLS estimates reported before. A Hausman test cannot reject the null that the difference between the 2SLS and OLS coefficients is not systematic, indicating that any bias in OLS estimates is not severe. Hence, the basic results in Section IV are robust to endogeneity concerns.
B. Sample selection issues
The sample used in this study consists of firms that, conditional on the decision to raise outside funds, decide to issue debt rather than equity. Therefore, it could be argued that the sample of firms issuing debt is not a random sample, and that this self-selection of firms can bias the coefficient estimates reported in previous sections.
To address this issue, I extended previous specifications to include an adjustment term for sample selection as suggested by Heckman (1979) . Specifically, I estimate a first-stage Probit of the debt-equity choice using all firms in the S&P indices, and then control for selection bias by including the Inverse Mills Ratio from this Probit in the second-stage regressions predicting the at-issue yield spreads. Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) , the determinants of the debt-equity choice included in the first-stage are recorded at year end preceding the debt-equity decision, and include industry leverage at two-SIC digits (a proxy for target leverage), the firm's leverage, stock price returns, ROA, the market-to-book ratio, issue size as a percentage of assets, Altman's z-score as a measure of bankruptcy probability, and year dummies. The Inverse Mills Ratio is not statistically significant when added to the regressions in tables 4, 5, and 6, while the coefficients on the incentive variables remain statistically significant and of similar magnitudes. Thus, my results are not driven by sample selection concerns.
C. Are results driven by firms with multiple issues?
Given that there is variation in the number of bonds issued by each firm during the sample period, it could be argued that firms with many issues in a year tend to receive too much weight while firms with only a few issues per year receive too little weight in the estimation. To address this concern, I restrict the sample to allow only one issue per firm-year. For firms with multiple issues in a given year, I select the bond with the largest amount issued. Repeating the analysis on this restricted sample gives qualitative results that are similar to those obtained from the original sample.
D. Are results driven by outliers?
I also explore whether the results are sensitive to the presence of outliers and influential observations. First, I winzorize each continuous variable at the 1% and 5% level at each tail of the distribution and repeat the regression analysis for each case.
Second, I perform the analysis using the robust estimation method given by STATA's rreg command 10 . Both procedures give results that are similar to those reported.
E. Non-linearity in control variables
The previous analysis uses a logarithmic relation between the yield spreads and credit ratings. As an alternative in allowing non-linearity, I use the square of the credit rating index. The results are similar to those reported. I also consider allowing a nonlinear relation between yield spreads and the continuous control variables. Adding squared terms of all continuous control variables to the regressions reported in tables 4, 5, and 6 does not affect the results.
F. Alternative measures of firm characteristics
The results are also robust to alternative measures of the firm characteristics.
Replacing the natural logarithm of the firm's assets by other measures of firm size, such as the natural logarithm of firm sales or firm value (defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt) does not affect the results. The results are also similar if market leverage is used instead of book leverage, and if a de-trended version of business risk is used instead of the standard deviation of the firm's cash flow.
G. Other control variables
It has been suggested that for firms with relatively short-term debt there are essentially no agency costs of debt finance (Parrino and Weisbach (1999) ). Also, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) take the position that short-term debt reduces the incentive for risky assets substitution, because short-term bond prices are relatively insensitive to shifts in risk of the underlying assets. I control for the proportion of total debt that is long term and results remain unchanged.
To control for industry specific changes in the economic environment from one year to another that could differentially affect industry risk, I also interact year and industry dummies. All the results in the paper remain unchanged.
VI. Summary and conclusions
Risk-averse managers may have a preference for lower risk than well-diversified shareholders, and so management's investment decisions are likely to be biased towards low risk projects at the expense of shareholders. However, inducing managers to hold stock and stock options in the firm helps align managerial and shareholder interests.
Thus, the extent to which management will take risk to maximize shareholder value is related to the size of their ownership stakes in the firm.
Because shareholders often have an incentive to take risky investment projects that increase their wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth, the risk-taking incentives contained in managerial incentive structures are of particular importance to lenders. If ownership of stock and stock options contains information about future risk choices by top managers, then rational bondholders should incorporate this information in the pricing of new debt issues. As a result, managerial incentives and bond yields are potentially related. However, very little is known about the nature of this relation.
To investigate the connection between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, I regress at-issue yield spreads of corporate bonds on measures of top-management ownership, while controlling for bond issue and firm characteristics. The evidence supports the hypothesis that bondholders anticipate future risk choices by management at the time of the debt issue, and that firms whose management has stronger incentives to maximize shareholder value pay higher costs for their debt issues. Furthermore, a higher alignment of managerial and shareholder incentives generates higher agency costs of debt when managers have more flexibility to choose investment policy. I also find that the effect of managerial stock option holdings on yield spreads is larger than the effect of equity holdings. This finding is consistent with stock options providing better incentives to take risk than stock, and with prospective bondholders anticipating higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership. In addition, I find that the relation between managerial incentives and at-issue yield spreads is increasing but concave, suggesting that at high ownership levels the positive effect of further increases in managerial ownership on borrowing costs is mitigated by either managerial entrenchment or increased risk aversion.
Overall, this study adds to previous work by showing that lenders rationally price bond issues using the information about the firm's future risk choices that is contained in managerial incentive structures. Thus, managerial incentives to maximize shareholder wealth are related to the agency costs of debt finance.
Table 1 Bond issue and issuing firm characteristics
The sample consists of 1,360 public straight debt offers made by U.S. firms in 1994-2000. Bond data are obtained from SDC corporation, while firm characteristics are from S&P's Compustat. Relative Offer Size is the amount issued as a percentage of firm's assets at the year-end preceding the offer. Subordinated, Callable, Sinking Fund and Change in Control are dummy variables for whether the bond issue is subordinated to other types of debt, callable before maturity, has a sinking fund provision or has a change in control put option, respectively, and zero otherwise. Credit Rating is constructed according to Moody's classification. Profitability is operating income before depreciation as a percentage of firm's assets. Business Risk is the standard deviation of the profitability measure using five years of data. The market-tobook ratio is the book value of debt plus the market value of common equity and preferred stock divided by the book value of assets. The interest coverage is the ratio of operating income before depreciation (OIBD) to interest expense (set equal to zero if OIBD<0). The remaining variables are self explanatory. All firm characteristics are recorded at the year-end preceding the bond issue. SPREAD: at-issue yield spread of the bond issued over that of a U. S. Treasury security of comparable maturity (basis points).
Managerial Incentives (recorded at year-end preceding the bond issue):
ALPHA: the number of firm's shares held by the top five executives plus the number of shares related to top-management unexercised stock options as a percentage of total shares outstanding.
OWNER: the number of firm's shares held by the top five executives as a percentage of total shares outstanding.
OPTIONS: the number of shares related to top-management unexercised stock options as a percentage of total shares outstanding.
Bond Characteristics:
RATING: the residual of a regression of the natural logarithm of a bond rating index on the managerial incentives variables. The bond rating index is based on Moody's classification, ranging from 1 to 7, where Caa-C=1, B1-B3=2, Ba1-Ba3=3, Baa1-Baa3=4, A1-A3=5, Aa1-Aa3=6, and Aaa=7. Thus, the variable captures a firm's credit quality net of the information contained in managerial incentives.
RELAMOUNT: the amount issued as a percentage of total firm assets at year-end preceding the bond issue.
YRSTOMAT: the maturity of the issue (years).
SUBORD: dummy variable equal to one if the issue is subordinated, and zero otherwise.
CALLABLE: dummy variable equal to one if the issue is callable, and zero otherwise.
SINKFUND: dummy variable equal to one if the issue has a sinking fund provision, and zero otherwise.
CHGCONTROL: dummy variable equal to one if the issue includes a change in control put option, and zero otherwise. SIZE: the natural logarithm of the firm assets.
DAT: debt to assets ratio (percentage).
PROFITABILITY: operating income before depreciation as a percentage of firm's assets.
BUSRISK: standard deviation of operating income before depreciation as a percentage of firm's assets. The calculation uses the five years preceding the bond issue.
MTBR: market-to-book ratio, the book value of debt plus the market value of common equity and preferred stock divided by the book value of assets.
INTCOV: interest coverage, the ratio of operating income before depreciation to interest expenses (set equal to zero when operating income is negative).
TANGIBILITY: net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets (percentage)
CAPEX: capital expenditures divided by sales (percentage)
RDEXP: R&D expense divided by sales (percentage). Missing observations are set equal to zero.
MISSINGRD: dummy variable equal to one if the original R&D expense data is missing, and zero otherwise.
UNIQUE: dummy variable equal to one if the firm's SIC code is between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing computers, semiconductors, chemicals and allied, aircraft, guided missiles, and space vehicles and other sensitive industries), and zero otherwise.
PAYDIV: dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays common dividends, and zero otherwise.
LOSS: dummy variable equal to one if ROA is negative, and zero otherwise.
Table 4
OLS regressions of at-issue yield spreads on managerial incentives
The table reports the results of regressing the at-issue yield spread (in basis points) on managerial incentive measures and a vector of firm and bond issue control variables. All regressions include year dummies and one-digit SIC industry dummies (not reported). The t-statistics reported in parentheses below each estimate are constructed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are also adjusted for the clustering of observations in firms that make multiple issues. * and ** mean significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. The table reports the results of regressing the at-issue yield spread (in basis points) on OPTIONS, OWNER, and a vector of firm and bond issue control variables. All regressions include year and one-digit SIC industry dummies (not reported). The t-statistics reported in parentheses below each estimate are constructed using heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors that are also adjusted for the clustering of observations in firms that make multiple issues. * and ** mean significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
Variable
(1) (2) Table 6 OLS regressions of at-issue yield spreads on managerial incentives, with squared terms
The table reports the results of regressing the at-issue yield spread (in basis points) on different measures of managerial incentives, including squared terms and a vector of firm and bond issue control variables. All regressions include year and one-digit SIC industry dummies (not reported). The t-statistics reported in parentheses below each estimate are constructed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are also adjusted for the clustering of observations in firms that make multiple issues. * and ** mean significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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